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BIASED EVIDENCE RULES: A FRAMEWORK FOR JUDICIAL
ANALYSIS AND REFORM
Randolph N. Jonakait"

I. INTRODUCTION

Biased evidence rules, those that permit one party to use a
kind or class of evidence while prohibiting the other from using it,
give adversaries unequal weapons. Truth seems less likely to
emerge from an adversarial testing when participants do not have
the same devices to demonstrate strengths and weaknesses in the
competing claims.1 Since a good evidence law should aid the
determination of truth,2 neutral evidence rules should be required.

* Professor, New York Law School. A.B. Princeton University, 1967; J.D., University
of Chicago Law School, 1970; LL.M., New York University Law School, 1971.
1. Cf. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62
HARV. L. REV. 177, 185 (1948) ('The theory of the system is that in the contest between
the parties, each interested to demonstrate the strength of his own contentions and to
expose the weakness of his opponent's, the truth will emerge."); see also Imwinkelried,
Of Evidence and Equal Protection: The Unconstitutionalityof Excluding Government
Agents' Statements Offered as Vicarious Admissions Against the Prosecution,71 MINN.
L. REV. 269 (1986). Professor Imwinkelried stated:
[A] key tenet of the adversary system is that both litigants must stand on
equal footing before the judge. If the adversaries realize that they stand on
equal footing, all sides have the same incentive to collect evidence before
trial and attempt to introduce the evidence at trial. Equalizing the incentive level for all the litigants ideally results in the fullest factual record
at trial and the most thorough airing of the issues in the case.
Id. at 314 (footnotes omitted).
2. See Weinstein, Some Difficulties in Devising Rules for Determining Truth in
JudicialTrials, 66 CoLUM. L. REV. 223 (1966). In the article, the author states:
Once the judicial framework has been established, the [evidence code]
draftsman must strike a balance among the goals desirable and achievable
within that framework. Truth finding must be a central purpose whatever
the tribunal. Unless we are to assume that the substantive law is perverse
or irrelevant to the public welfare, then its enforcement is properly the
primary aim of litigation; and the substantive law can be best enforced if
litigation results in accurate determinations of facts made material by the
applicable rule of law. Unless reasonably accurate fact finding is assumed,
there does not appear to be any sound basis for our judicial system.
Id. at 243; see alsoJonakait, Restoring the ConfrontationClauseto the Sixth Amendment,
35 UCLA L. REV. 557,577 (1988) ("Although evidence law may have subsidiary purposes,
its prime goal is to advance the accuracy of the courts' fact finding function.")..
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In reality, however, all evidence principles are not impartial
between the parties.3 The Federal Rules of Evidence sometimes
grant evidentiary mechanisms to just one class of parties.
Although principles of our adversary system ought to make such
rules suspect, the courts can and should reform only some of them.
Courts and legislators, driven by differing reasons, have produced
the biased provisions. Categorizing those reasons provides the
analytical starting point for the judicial treatment of biased
evidence rules.

II. EXPLICTrLY BIASED RULES

A Rules Explicitly FavoringCriminalDefendants

Evidentiary provisions that intentionally aid criminal
defendants are the most defensible category of biased evidence
rules. Even though biased, such rules may actually assist accurate
factfinding or otherwise further our notions of justice. The general
character evidence rules serve as an example.
The prosecution, as part of its case-in-chief, cannot introduce
character evidence to show that the accused committed the crime
by acting in conformity with his character. Defendants, however,
can introduce character evidence to show that they did not commit
the crime.4 One reason for this bias is that the jury will be overly
influenced by the negative character evidence and will, therefore,
less likely reach an accurate verdict if allowed to consider such
evidence.5 In contrast, the accused's introduction of the compara3. The majority of evidence rules, however, are not biased. See Imwinkelried, supra
note 1, at 313 ("In most cases, whatever the identity of the proponent of the evidence,
the foundatio'nal requirements for admitting the evidence and the possible objections to
admission remain the same.").
4. See FED. R EviD. 404(a) ("Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character
is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except: ... Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an accused,
or by the prosecution to rebut the same .... 11)
5. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948) ("The inquiry is not
rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much
with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record
and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge.")

No. 1]

BIASED EVIDENCE RULES

69

ble character evidence can assist accuracy because "with the
danger of prejudicing the defendant gone, the probative value of
the evidence outweighs the disadvantages of allowing admission."'
This biased rule, then, while seemingly cutting against the tenets
of the adversary system, actually improves factual determina7
tions.
I A good evidence law, however, does more than promote truth.
It also serves justice.8 As one commentator notes:
Central to the Anglo-American system of criminal law is the
concept that the accused must be protected against
inculpation through proof of his past misdeeds. Closely
analogous is the familiar rule that a person is innocent until
proven guilty of the particular act charged. One form of
protection is constitutional-the privilege against compelled
self-incrimination. A second-which may not be constitutionally guaranteed but which is accepted by all American
jurisdictions-is the exclusionary rule embodied in Rule 404;

The Court of Appeals of New York, in People v. Zackowitz, stated:
There may be cogency in the argument that a quarrelsome defendant is
more likely to start a quarrel than one of milder type, a man of dangerous
mode of life more likely than a shy recluse. The law is not blind to this, but
equally it is not blind to the peril to the innocent if character is accepted
as probative of crime. "The natural and inevitable tendency of the
tribunal-whether judge or jury-is to give excessive weight to the vicious
record of crime thus exhibited, and either to allow it to bear too strongly, on
the present charge, or to take the proof of it as justifying a condemnation
irrespective of guilt of the present charge."
254 N.Y. 192, 198; 172 N.E. 466, 468 (1930) (quoting 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 199).
6. R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 237 (2d ed.
1982).
7. For a related example, see FED. R. EVID. 609 committee note to 1990 amendment
("IT'he rule recognizes that, in virtually every case in which prior convictions are used
to impeach the testifying [criminal] defendant, the defendant faces a unique risk of
prejudice-ie., the danger that convictions that would be excluded under Fed. R. Evid.
404 will be misused by a jury as propensity evidence despite their introduction solely for
impeachment purposes.").
8. See S. LANDSMAN, READINGS ONADVERSARIALJUSTICE: THE AMERICANAPPROACH

TO ADJUDICATION 27 (1988) ("Truth is not the end the courts seek. Truth is nothing more
than a means of achieving the end, justice."); cf. M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN
ADVERSARY SYSTEM 2 (1975) ("A trial is, in part, a search for truth.... Actually,
however, a trial is far more than a search for truth, and the constitutional rights that
are provided by our system of justice may well outweigh the truth-seeking value ....
").
Rule 102 has the twin goals of truth and justice and states that "[these rules shall
be construed... to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly
determined."
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it renders inadmissible, as part of the prosecution's evidence
in chief, character evidence offered solely to show the accused's propensity to commit the crime with which he is
charged. 9

With our firm, constitutionally based concern about convicting the
innocent,' justice may require procedures, including evidence
rules, that are specially protective of criminal defendants." Even

if such rules may harm accurate factflnding, the biased provisions
created to serve this aspect of justice should be preserved by the

courts. Judges should not tamper with biased evidence rules
favoring criminal defendants, especially when rational arguments
indicate that these provisions actually enhance correct trial
determinations.

B. Rules Explicitly Favoringa Civil Party

The reasons that justify biased rules for criminal defendants
do not support a rule that expressly favors one class of civil parties

over the other. While only the defendant might be unfairly
prejudiced from a category of evidence in

criminal trials, a

comparable dynamic is not likely in civil cases. Character evidence, for example, should not prejudice civil plaintiffs as a class

,9. J.

WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE MANUAL § 7.01[01] (1987).
10. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) C'[W]e do not
view the social disutility of convicting an innocent man as equivalent to the disutility of
acquitting someone who is guilty.... I view the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a fundamental value determination of
our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go
free.").
11. But see Saltzburg, Lawyers, Clients, and the Adversary System, 37 MERCER L.
REV. 647 (1986). Saltzburg asserts:
That incidents of trial may differ somewhat in civil and criminal
cases does not mean that the goals of the process also differ. Because of
concern for the individual and realization of the power of the state to
stigmatize and punish criminal offenders in special ways, the American legal system gives the benefit of uncertainty to the criminal defendant. This
means that the government bears the risk of an erroneous decision in a
very special way, but it does not mean that the goal of the criminal trial is
different from the goal of a civil trial.
Id. at 660.
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any more than civil defendants. Because our sense of justice does
not favor one group of parties over another in civil disputes,'
preferential evidence rules in noncriminal matters make little
sense. Consequently, courts should be hostile to such biased
evidence rules.
The United States Supreme Court demonstrated such
hostility to biased evidence rules in civil disputes in Green v. Bock
Laundry Machine Co.,' 3 where it encountered Rule 609 governing
impeachment by convictions in civil cases. Rule 609(a) had
required that evidence of a felony conviction be admitted to
impeach the testimony of a witness if "the court determines that
the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect to the defendant ....
Read literally, this rule
was biased because it always permitted impeachment of a
plaintiff, but not a civil defendant. The provision allowed the
evidence to be excluded only when the court determined that the
prejudice from the evidence "to the defendant" outweighed its
probative value. Impeaching the plaintiff, of course, will not
prejudice the defendant. In contrast, evidence impeaching the civil
defendant could be excluded because the prejudicial effect to the
defendant may outweigh its probative value. 5

12. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 371 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("In a civil suit between two
private parties for money damages,... we view it as no more serious in general for there
to be an erroneous verdict in the defendant's favor than for there to be an erroneous
verdict in plaintiff's favor.").
13. 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
14. Before the 1990 amendment, Rule 609(a) provided:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness
has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted... but only if the crime (1) was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under
which the witness was convicted, and the court determines that. the probative
value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant
FED. R. Evi). 609(a).
15.
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, noted:
The Rule's plain language commands weighing of prejudice to a defendant
in a civil trial as well as in a criminal trial. But that literal reading would compel
an odd result in a case like this [a product liability suit]. Assuming that all
impeaching evidence has at least minimal probative value, and given that the evidence of plaintiffi's] ... convictions had some prejudicial effect on his case-but
surely none on defendant Bock's-balancing according to the strict language of
Rule 609(a)(1) inevitably leads to the conclusion that the evidence was admissible.
In fact, under this construction of the Rule, impeachment detrimental to a civil
plaintiff always would have to be admitted.
Green, 490 U.S. at 509-10.
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Confronting the explicitly biased provision of Rule 609, the
Court concluded that distinguishing between the rights of civil
plaintiffs and defendants did not further a rational purpose and
was probably unconstitutional. 16 The rule could not mean what
its literal words said. The Court noted: "No matter how plain the
text of the Rule may be, we cannot accept an interpretation that
would deny a civil plaintiff the same right to impeach an
adversary's testimony that it grants to a civil defendant."' 7
Consequently the Court went on to do what all courts should do
when faced with such a biased rule in the civil context;' 8 it
interpreted the provision so that it would be neutral between civil
plaintiffs and defendants.' 9

16. Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, stated:
We are confronted here with a statute which, if interpreted literally,
produces an absurd, and perhaps unconstitutional, result....
The word "defendant" in Rule 6 09(a)(1) cannot rationally (or perhaps even
constitutionally) mean to provide the benefit of prejudice-weighing to civil defendants and not civilplaintiffs. Since petitioner has not produced and we have not
ourselves discovered even a snippet of support for this absurd result, we may
confidently assume that the word was not used (as it normally would be) to refer
to all defendants and only all defendants.
Id. at 528-29 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
17. Id. at 510 (Stevens, J., for the Court). The Court continued:
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant
certain fair trial rights not enjoyed by the prosecution, while the Fifth Amendment lets the accused choose not to testify at trial. In contrast, civil litigants in
federal court share equally the protections of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.... Denomination as a civil defendant or plaintiff, moreover, is often
happenstance based on which party filed first or on the nature of the suit.
Evidence that a litigant or his witness is a convicted felon tends to shift a jury's
focus from the worthiness of the litigants's position to the moral worth of the
litigant himself. It is unfathomable why a civil plaintiff-but not a civil defendant-should be subjected to this risk.
Id, at 510-11 (footnotes omitted).
18. Professor Imwinkelried commented on the Green decision:
Justice Stevens' reasoning is sensible. It is a "cardinal principle" that when
a statute is subject to two interpretations--one which raises significant
doubts about its constitutionality and another which moots those doubts,
the court should prefer the latter construction. . . . In Green, Justice
Stevens essentially advanced the argument that interpreting Rule 609(a)(1)
to protect civil defendants but not civil plaintiffs would give rise to
significant doubts about the constitutionality of the provision.
Imwinkelried, The Right to "PleadOut" Issues and Block the Admission of Prejudicial
Evidence: The Differential Treatment of Civil Litigants and the Criminal Accused as a
Denial of Equal Protection,40 EMORY L.J. 341, 361-62 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
19. The Court, after examining the provision's legislative history, concluded that the
then Rule 609(a)(1) required a trial judge to allow impeachment by evidence of prior
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C. Rules Explicitly Favoringthe Prosecution

If courts ought to be hostile to explicitly biased rules in civil
cases, the courts should be even more antagonistic to provisions
explicitly favoring the prosecution in criminal cases. Provisions
purposely advantaging the prosecution conflict with the basic constitutional values that protect criminal defendants. If possible,
courts should find ways to interpret such biased rules favoring the
prosecution in a neutral fashion. The hearsay exception for
statements against interest found in Rule 804(b)(3) provides an
example.
Rule 804(b)(3) imposes a corroboration requirement on an
accused seeking to admit a statement against penal interest, but
not 6n the prosecution introducing such hearsay.' Commentators
have denounced the asymmetric corroboration requirement as
"constitutionally suspect,"2 ' and a number of courts have re-

felony convictions of all civil witnesses regardless of the prejudice resulting to the party
offering the testimony. See Green, 490 U.S. at 527. The Rule, effective December 1, 1990,
now reads:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, (1) evidence that
a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted,
subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in
excess of one year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the
court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs
its prejudicial effect to the accused....
FED. R EVID. 609(a).
20. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). Rule 804(b)(3) excepts from the hearsay rule:
A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the
declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the
declarant to ... criminal liability .. . that a reasonable person in the
declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing
it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal
liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
Id21. See Tague, Perilsof the Rulemaking Process:The Development,Application, and
Unconstitutionalityof Rule 804(b)(3)s Penal InterestException, 69 GEo. LJ.851 (1981).
Professor Tague argues:
As formulated, the rule is constitutionally suspect in four respects. First,
Congress relied on several unwarranted assumptions to justify the high
corroboration burden imposed on the defendant. Second, the rule improperly discriminates between the defendant and the Government because
the defendant alone must satisfy the corroboration requirement. Third, if
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sponded by, in effect, rewriting the rule and creating a corroboration requirement for the prosecution as well.'
A correct rule would not favor the prosecution. The only

question is whether the courts have the authority to impose
neutrality on the explicitly biased provision. The parallels between
Green v. Bock Machine Laundry Co. and the penal interest
provision indicate that courts do possess that power. In Green the
Supreme Court noted that the impeachment provision had no
reasonable purpose and was probably unconstitutional.' Similarly, the biased portion of Rule 804(b)(3) does not enhance accurate
factfinding and cuts against constitutional values.' Because the

the defendant does not satisfy the corroboration requirement, the rule
forecloses jury assessment of the declarant's credibility. Finally, the rule
clashes with the defendant's fifth and sixth amendment rights to introduce
evidence.
Id. at 980.
22. See E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 826 (3rd ed. 1984) ('Some courts have
imposed an additional factual safeguard upon the use of statements inculpating an
accused person by requiring that they be corroborated, thus in effect reading into Federal
Evid. Rule 804(b)(3) with regard to inculpatory statements the same provision there
expressly stated with regard to exculpatory statements."); see, e.g., United States v.
Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 1420 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Koskerides, 877 F.2d 1129,
1135-36 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694,701 (5th Cir. 1978). Some
courts have not formally resolved the issue. See, e.g., United States v. Holland, 880 F.2d
1091, 1093 (9th Cir. 1989) (court did not have to decide whether inculpatory statements
must be corroborated because sufficient corroboration present).
23. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text (discussing Green).
24. See Sharp, MilitaryRuleofEvidence 804 (b)(3)sStatementAgainstPenalInterest
Exception: Can the Rule Stand on Its Own? 130 MIL. L. REV. 77, 118 (1990) C'There is
no logical reason to explain why the government's witnesses should be considered more
reliable than those of the defense. Indeed, the government has many more ways to
induce persons to testify falsely than does the defense.").
Another parallel between the former version of Rule 609(a)(1) and the present version of Rule 804(b)(3) is that the explicit bias in each seems to have come about more
from inattentiveness or inadvertence than by design. The Green Court's review of Rule
609(a)(1)'s history indicated that the drafters had meant to protect criminal defendants
from certain impeachment by prior convictions. Nothing indicated, however, that they
intended to distinguish between civil plaintiffs and defendants. See Green, 490 U.S. at
511-24.
Similarly, the drafters of Rule 804(b)(3) did not address the biased nature of the
rule they created. One commentator explains:
During the course of the expansion of the hearsay exception to
include declarations against penal interest, the situation principally in
contemplation and raised in the cases was a confession... offered by the
defense to exculpate the accused.... While the possibility was recognized
that statements against penal interest might inculpate an accused person,
... the question of their admissibility was raised infrequently in cases or
the literature.
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Court had the power to disregard the literal language of the
former version of Rule 609(a)(1) to avoid the constitutional
problem,' courts have a similar power to produce neutrality in
the present version of Rule 804(b)(3).2

E. CLARY, supra note 22, at 824. Another commentator notes:
[O]ne looks in vain in the legislative history for a discussion of how the
proposed rule was meant to affect a defendant's rights under the confrontation clause. The rule restricts a defendant's use of statements against
penal interest, but not the government's ....[Tihe rule ... had not been
considered carefully.
Sharp, supra, at 97. The Fifth Circuit, after reviewing the legislative history of Rule
804(b)(3) concluded, "Thus, while specifically addressing exculpatory statements, the
draftsmen of the new rules left to the courts the task of delineating prerequisites to the
admissibility of inculpatory against-interest hearsayY United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d
694, 700 (5th Cir. 1978). For the fullest discussion of the history of the rule, see Tague,
supra note 21.
At least some drafters, after the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, confronted the bias in the penal interest exception and did away with it See, e.g., OHIO R.
EVID). 804(B)(3), which provides in part, "A statement tending to expose the declarant to
criminal liability, whether offered to exculpate or inculpate the accused, is not admissible
unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness .of the
statement"
25. See supra note 18 (when statute is subject to two interpretations, court should
favor one that moots doubt of constitutionality).
26. The conclusion that courts should interpret Rule 804(b)(3) to end the bias in
favor of the prosecutor does not indicate how that bias should be eliminated. Two choices
are apparent. Courts can remove the corroboration requirement for criminal defendants
or they can require corroboration from the prosecution. Recent Supreme Court decisions
on the Federal Rules of Evidence favor interpretations that allow more evidence to be
admitted. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 526 (1989)
(permitting impeachment of civil witnesses with evidence of prior felony convictions);
United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 563 (1988) (adopting interpretation of Rule
801(d)(1)(C) that made it easier to have prior identification testimony admitted);
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 688-89 (1988) (accepting interpretation that
made it easier to admit prior crime evidence under Rule 404(b)); Bourjaily v. United
States, 483 U.S. 171, 183-89 (1987) (interpretingcoconspirator hearsay provision to allow
more hearsay to be introduced); United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45,49 (1984) (permitting
extrinsic evidence of gang membership to prove bias of witness); cf.Haddad, The Future
of Confrontation Clause Developments: What Will Emerge When the Supreme Court
Synthesizes the DiuerseLines of ConfrontationDecisions?,81 J. CRIM.L.& CRIMINOLOGY
77 (1990). Haddad observed: "Professor Ronald Allen has pointed out that the [confrontation] hearsay cases and the [confrontation] impeachment cases are compatible in
one sense: both favor the admissibility of evidence, whether offered by the prosecution
or the defense." Id at 90. But see Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3152 (1990) (holding
admission of hearsay evidence of child victim under Idaho's residual exception violated
Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause).
The tendency to favor the admission of evidence might indicate that courts ought
to interpret the penal interest exception to allow more evidence to be admitted. That
would mean dropping the corroboration requirement for exculpatory hearsay. The reasoning of Green, however, demonstrates that corroboration should be imposed on both
sides. In Green, the Court held that the biased impeachment provision of Rule 609(a)
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III. RULES MADE BIASED BY JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION

Judicial interpretation can transform a facially neutral
evidence rule into a biased one. Courts can add a gloss to a

provision that permits one group of parties to use evidence while
forbidding or making it difficult for other parties to use the same
or comparable evidence. Judges might rationally defend their
moves away from neutrality when the judicial action assists
accurate factfinding or otherwise serves justice. The Supreme

Court, however, in Huddleston v. United States27 has indicated
that courts cannot create biased rules out of facially neutral ones.
In Huddleston, the Court considered Rule 404(b), which is
impartial on its face. The Rule expressly permits the introduction
of prior crime evidence in all cases and by all parties when that

evidence tends to prove something other than the character of a
person.'8 In practice, however, the benefits and dangers of the

could not be interpreted as written. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
Having come to that conclusion, however, the Court still had to decide how the Rule
should be interpreted. The Court examined the structure of the Rule and its history and
concluded that "Rule 609(a)(1)'s exclusion of civil witnesses from its weighing language
is a specific command that impeachment of such witnesses be admitted, which overrides
a judge's general discretionary authority under Rule 403." Green, 490 U.S. at 505.
The corroboration requirement for exculpatory statements against penal interest
is a specific mandate of Rule 804(b)(3) put in place to mediate differing concerns about
the provision. As the advisory committee stated:
The refusal of the common law to concede the adequacy of a penal interest
was no doubt indefensible in logic .... but one senses in the decisions a
distrust of evidence of confessions by third persons offered to exculpate the
accused arising from suspicions of fabrication either of the fact of the
making of the confession or in its contents, enhanced in either instance by
the required unavailability of the declarant. . . . The requirement of
corroboration is included in the rule in order to effect an accommodation
between these competing considerations.
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee's note. To follow this legislative intent and
to eliminate the bias, the correct solution is to impose corroboration on both inculpatory
and exculpatory statements.
27. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
28. See FED. R. EvID. 404(b). Rule 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the
prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance
of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause
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rule are not equal to all parties. It is the prosecution that most
often seeks to use the Rule and the accused who most often will
be unfairly prejudiced by it. Indeed, the dangers of unfair prejudice to the accused are present every time the prosecutor introduces such evidence.2 Even when the other-crimes evidence
properly establishes something apart from the character of the
accused, it still brands the accused as a criminal and is likely to
be misused by the jury. s Such misuse, of course, interferes with
the evidence law's goal of obtaining just and accurate verdicts.
Consequently, some courts believed that justice and accuracy
would be furthered by engrafting special requirements onto Rule
404(b). Even though not explicitly required by the Rule, these
courts allowed the prosecution to introduce other-crimes evidence
only after first establishing by a preponderance of the evidence or
by clear and convincing evidence that the accused had committed
the other crime.3' These courts were, in effect, creating a biased
shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce
at trial.

Id29. These dangers are significant, as evidenced by the fact that Rule 404(b) is more
frequently litigated in the appellate courts than any other provision of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. See 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
EVIDENCE § 5239, at 427 (1978).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Byrd, 352 F.2d 570, 574 (2d Cir. 1965) C'[Tlhere can
be no complete assurance that the jury even under the best of instructions will strictly
confine the use of [evidence of other crimes] to the issue of knowledge and intent and
wholly put out of their minds the implication that the accused, having committed the
prior similar criminal act, probably committed the one with which he is actually
charged.'); G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5.15, at 162 (2d ed.
1987) (discussing "the great potential for prejudicial consequences inherent in other-

crimes evidence").
Professor Imwinkelried surveyed the literature and concluded:
Numerous empirical studies document the risk that the jury will misuse
the evidence and try the person rather than the case. The judge may
ostensibly admit the evidence on a limited, noncharacter theory of
relevance, but the jury might treat the evidence as proof of the accused's
bad character and penalize the accused for his or her character.
Imwinkelried, supra note 18, at 373 (footnotes omitted).
31. The United States Supreme Court surveyed the circuits and concluded:
The First, Fourth; Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits allow the admission of similar act evidence if the evidence is sufficient to allow the jury to find that
the defendant committed the act.... Consistent with the Sixth Circuit, the
Second Circuit prohibits the introduction of similar act evidence unless the
trial court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
committed the act.... The Seventh, Eight, Ninth, and District of Columbia
Circuits require the Government to prove to the court by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant committed the similar act.
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rule in favor of criminal defendants by placing a special burden on
the prosecution. Although the additional requirement might have
enhanced accurate factfinding and served important constitutional
values, the Supreme Court eliminated it. The Huddleston Court
held that the added requirement was "inconsistent with the
structure of the Rules of Evidence and with the plain language of
Rule 404(b).... The text [of Rule 404(b)] contains no intimation
...that any preliminary showing is necessary before such [othercrimes] evidence may be introduced for a proper purpose.' 2
The courts could not create a Rule 404(b) biased in the
accused's favor even though the result may have served the
purposes of evidence law better than the express wording of the
Rule. 3 Similarly the courts cannot create preferential rules out
of impartial provisions in other, less justifiable, situations. Rules
made biased by judicial interpretation must be changed.
For example, the judicially created bias prohibiting criminal
defendants from introducing agency admissions by government
employees should cease. The leading case of United States v.
Santos' demonstrates this bias. In Santos the defendant was
charged with assaulting a federal drug agent.3s Another agent, in
a sworn affidavit, had identified someone other than Santos as the
assailant. The Second Circuit, however, held that Santos could not
introduce the sworn affidavit as an admission of an agent. The
court did recognize the biased nature of its ruling. It conceded that
while statements by an accused's agents may come in as agency
admissions, the sworn affidavit by a government agent did not
constitute an agency admission by the government because of the
government's unique status as a party2 7

U.S. at 685 n.2; cf. C. MUELLER & L. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER
THE RULES: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 508 (1988) ("Most other acts proved pursuant
Huddleston, 485

to FRE 404(b) are themselves crimes, and most courts require the government to prove
these extrinsic offenses by 'clear and convincing evidence.").
32. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 687-88.
33. Huddleston held that other-crimes evidence should be treated like any other
question of conditional relevancy, which is governed by Rule 104(b). See id. at 689. Under
Rule 104(b) the "court simply examines all the evidence in the case and decides whether
the jury could reasonably find the conditional fact-here, that the [act was a crime]-by
a preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 690.
34. 372 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1967).
35. See id, at 178-80. The facts are taken from the court's opinion in Santos.
36. See id. at 179.
37. In Santos the Court concluded, "This apparent discrimination is explained by the
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The Santos court's interpretation must be changed. Even if
there is merit in the logic of Santos, the controlling factor is that
the applicable rule is facially neutral.'8 The text of Rule

peculiar posture of the parties in a criminal prosecution-the only party on the
government side being the Government itself whose many agents and actors are
supposedly uninterested personally in the outcome of the trial and are historically unable
to bind the sovereign." Id. at 180.
Professors Louisell and Mueller criticize this logic:'
To the suggestion that government agents are "uninterested personally" in
the outcome of government litigation, it may be replied that much the same
may usually be said of agents employed by private entities. It may be true
that to some extent the sheer size of the government and the protections
accorded by the civil service system may combine to dissociate any one
agent from success or failure in any one case, but there exist similar factors
in private industry, which sometimes involves massive entities and
restrictions in the form of federal and state regulations and clauses in
union contracts which similarly dissociate any one employee from success
or failure in a single case. To the suggestion that agents are "unable to bind
the sovereign," it may be replied that this principle only restates (indeed,
overstates) the question, which is whether an agent should be able not to
'%ind" but to make statements admissible against the sovereign.
4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 426, at 328 (1980).

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit also cricizes the logic of Santos.In United States v. Morgan, 581 F.2d 933 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the
court stated:,
[Santos] seemed to be distinguishing government agents from nongovern-

ment agents (whose statements regarding matters within the scope of the
agency may be attributed to their principals .. .) on the rationale that
government agents are "supposedly uninterestedpersonlly in the outcome
of the trial." ... The court did not explain the significance of this premise.
We are not told whether it follows that (a) it would be unfair to impute to
the government responsibility for the statements of its agents, or (b) such
statements lack the special assurances of trustworthiness that attend the
out-of-court statements of nongovernment agents.
Id. at 937-38 n.11.
38. See FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(2)(D). Rule 801(d)(2)(D) provides that a statement is not
hearsay if the statement is offered against a party and is "a statement by the partys
agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment,
made during the existence of the relationship." Id.
Santos was decided before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, but
courts continue to utilize its biased interpretation of the agency admissions exception to
the hearsay rule. For example, in United States v. Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 954 (1980), the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit recognized the pre-Rules doctrine that "admissions by government employees in criminal cases were viewed as outside the admissions exception to the hearsay
rule." Id. at 1246. The court then summarized Santos and concluded: "Nothing in the
Federal Rules of Evidence suggests an intention to alter the traditional rule and defendant has cited no truly contrary case indicating such a trend." Id.
Other courts have accepted Kampiles'reasoning that the Santos doctrine survives
because of legislative silence. See, e.g., United States v. Durrani, 659 F. Supp. 1183, 1185
(D.Conn.), aff'd, 835 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1987). For a criticism of this argument, see
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801(d)(2)(D) contains no intimation of this bias towards the
government. If, as Huddleston indicates, a neutral provision
cannot be transformed in favor of the accused, courts certainly
cannot make a neutral provision prefer the prosecution. Just as
any judicial interpretation must cease that creates a biased rule
out of a facially neutral one, so too must cease the doctrine that
treats statements by government agents differently from all other
agency admissions.
So far, however, courts have continued to interpret this
admission provision in a biased manner, although United States
v. GAF Corp.3 comes close to recognizing that the biased interpretation of the agency admission rule cannot continue in criminal
cases.' In GAF Corp. the defendants were convicted of federal
securities violations. Before the trials began, the government filed
a bill of particulars indicating that the relevant series of trades
took place in October and November, 1986. At the second trial,4 '
Jonakait, The Supreme Court, PlainMeaning, and the Changed Rules of Evidence, 68
TEX. L. REv. 745, 774-78 (1990). For an argument that equal protection makes
admissible statements of government agents as vicarious admissions, see Imwinkelried,
supra note 1.
39. 928 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1991).
40. Some courts in civil cases have rejected the biased interpretation of the agency
admission rule. See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 498 F. Supp. 353 (D.D.C.
1980). The court in American Tel. & Tel. rejected the government's claim, in a civil
antitrust action, that statements made by government officials outside the Justice
Department were not agency admissions. Id at 357-58. "Mhe admissibility of an
admission by a party-opponent is a consequence, not of trustworthiness or lack of
burdensomeness, but of the adversary system of litigation.... The adversaries in this
litigation . . . are the United States of America and the American Telephone and
Telegraph Company." Id.; see also Corrigan v. United States, 609 F., Supp. 720 (E.D. Va.
1985), rev'd, 815 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 926 (1987). This case
involved a suit against the United -States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for
negligently serving alcohol to a person the government should have known was underage
and intoxicated. The court admitted the out-of-court statements of the bartender, a
government employee at a military club, who had served the drinks. The court stated:
The disputed statements were offered against the United States, and were
made by an agent or servant of the United States, Mrs. Brown, concerning
a matter within the scope of her employment. Mrs. Brown's statements
were made while she was still an employee of the United States. Therefore,
each element of Rule 801(d)(2)(D) has been met.
Id. at 727 n.3; see also Skaw v. United States, 740 F.2d 932, 937 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (in
action against United States for alleged taking of mining claims, statements made by
Forest Service employees against government could be considered on summary judgment
motion); Burkey v. Ellis, 483 F. Supp. 897, 911 n.13 (N.D. Ala. 1979) (in action to enjoin
government agencies, declarations made by government officials in environmental impact
statement were admissible against government).
41. The first trial ended in a mistrial because of the late disclosure by the prose-
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the defendants argued that a government witness was responsible
for the November trades. They asserted that since the government
contended in its bill of particulars that the October and November
trades were all part of one series, a reasonable doubt existed as to
whether the defendants, as opposed to the witness, were responsible for the October trades. A hung jury ensued.
Before the start of the next trial, the government amended its
bill of particulars and included only the October trades in the
charged series of transactions. The trial court denied the defendants' offer to admit the original bill stating that "there is no
doctrine of admissions 'against the government the same as there
would be against civil litigants or against defendants in a criminal
42
case.'
On appeal, the Second Circuit first noted its previous
holdings that defense counsel's statements made in an opening
argument could be admitted as admissions,4 and that inconsistent prior pleadings also were admissible.4 The court then
recognizedthat holding similar government statements inadmissible would lead to an unfair bias.
We think that the same considerations of fairness and
maintaining the integrity of the truth-seeking function of
trials that led this Court to find that opening statements of
counsel and prior pleadings constitute admissions also require
that a prior inconsistent bill of particulars be considered an
admission by the government in an appropriate situation.4 5
The court was correct in recognizing that an interpretation of
a neutral evidence rule that produces bias in favor of the prosecu-tion cannot stand. Courts, however, need to go even further. They
must not only eliminate the bias in the limited circumstances
considered in the GAF case, but reinterpret the general doctrine
of agency admissions by the government to eliminate that
doctrine's bias.4

cution of an expert's report. See GA, 928 F.2d at 1257.
42. Id. at 1258.
43. See id. at 1259 (citing United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1984)).
44. See id. at 1260 (citing Andrews v. Metro North Ri.R, 882 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1989)).

45. Id46. Cf. United States v. Kattar, 840 F.2d 118 (1st Cir. 1988), where the defendant
was convicted of extorting money from the Church of Scientology. A prosecution witness
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IV. FACIALLY NEUTRAL RULES wrH A DISPARATE IMPACT

Facially neutral rules that are interpreted impartially by the

courts can still be biased because their application predominantly
helps or hinders one class of parties. An' example is the ban on
proof of subsequent remedial measures to establish negligence.'
This doctrine, of course, tends to make it harder to prove

negligence. Because plaintiffs have the burden of proof on
negligence, the prohibition on subsequent remedial measures

disproportionately aids defendants.
The facially neutral provision allowing substantive use of
prior inconsistent statements is another rule with a similar

stated that the Church had once had a "Fair Game policy" whereby "enemies" of the
Church "[inay be deprived of property or injured by any means by any Scientologist
without any discipline of the Scientologist. [The enemy may] be tricked, sued or lied to
or destroyed." Id. at 125. Although the witness testified that policy had ended long before
the activities prompting the prosecution had occurred, the United States, in other cases,
had maintained that the Fair Game policy had continued, see id. at 125-26, information
that was kept from the jury. See id. at 127.
On appeal defendant contended that the assertions from the other cases were
admissible as agency admissions. The First Circuit expressed concern about the fairness
of the government's actions stating: "[1It is disturbing to see the Justice Department
change the color of its stripes to such a significant degree, portraying an organization,
individual, or series of events variously as virtuous and honorable or as corrupt and
perfidious, depending on the strategic necessities of the separate litigations." Id. at 127.
The court, however, did not construe the statements as agency admissions:
We need not deduce the scope of Rule 801(d)(2)(D)... because the statements here were admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(B) as statements of which
the party-opponent "has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth." The
Justice Department here has, as clearly as possible, manifested its belief
in the substance of the contested documents; it has submitted them to other
federal courts to show the truth of the matter contained therein.
Id. at 131; see also United States v. Ramirez, 894 F.2d 565, 570 (2d Cir. 1990) (indicating
that criminal defendant may introduce at trial statements made by government in search
warrant application as adoptive admissions); United States v. Morgan, 581 F.2d 933,
937-38 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (informant's statements that government characterized as
"reliable" in sworn affidavit were admissible against government at trial as adoptive
admissions).
47. Rule 407 provides:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would
have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent
measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence
of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving
ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted,
or impeachment.
FED. R. EVID. 407.
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disparate impact.48 As other commentators have explained, this
provision
is asymmetric in that its benefits accrue almost entirely to the
party having the burden of proof, that is, the prosecution in
criminal cases and the plaintiff in most aspects of civil actions.
The defending party is likely to be content with the traditional
rule admitting prior inconsistent statements for impeachment
only since if the jury disbelieves the testimony of crucial
prosecutorial
or plaintiffs witnesses, the defendant will
49
prevai.

Provisions such as these have a disparate impact on the
parties, but courts should not attempt to change them. These rules
are unlike the truly biased rules that either expressly or through
judicial interpretation prohibit a class of parties from introducing
evidence or impose special requirements on such a class. These
provisions do not explicitly treat civil plaintiffs differently than
civil defendants or prosecutors differently than criminal defendants. A defendant, as well as the party with the burden of
proof, can seek to introduce a prior inconsistent statement for its
substance. A plaintiff will not have to confront its subsequent
remedial measure when its contributory or comparative negligence
is at stake. Whenever such proof might be relevant, each group of
parties confronts the same evidentiary requirements. 50 The
disproportionate impact of such rules stems not from the evidence
law, but from the substantive law. These are not truly biased
evidentiary provisions and should not be changed by the courts.

48. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that a statement is not subject to the
general ban on hearsay "[i]f the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject
to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is... inconsistent
with the declarant's testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of
perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition ... .'FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(1)(A).
49. R. IEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 6, at 507.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Reed, 726 F.2d 570, 579-80 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 469
U.S. 871 (1984) (criminal defendants attempt to have prior inconsistent statements of
testifying witnesses admitted substantively failed because statements were not made
under conditions required by Rule 801(d)).
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V. THE BIAS iN ADmiSsIoNS

The final category of biased evidence rules, admissions, is
different from all the other biased provisions.5 ' Admissions seem
to be facially neutral. The governing provision does not put
restrictions on one particular party or grant a special license to
another. The rule makes no overt distinctions between the
prosecutor or the accused, as the character evidence or penal
interest provisions do, or between civil parties, as the old impeachment rule did. Even if the courts neutrally and correctly interpret
the agency admissions provisions to apply against the government
in criminal cases,52 the rule, produces asymmetrical results since
both sides do not have the same power to introduce identical or
comparable evidence.
Statements of the party, of course, can be introduced by the
party's opponent, but the party himself cannot introduce his own
words. A plaintiff can get into evidence the defendant's hearsay,
"I ran the red light." The defendant, however, cannot use the same
evidentiary provision to admit his comparable out-of-court
statement, "I did not run the red light." Even if the same words
are at stake, only one side determines whether the jury will hear
them. For example, either party might want admitted the
defendant's hearsay statement, "I pushed plaintiff because he
made fun of my dog." Even so, only the plaintiff could introduce
the statement as an admission.
This unbalanced result, however, is not unreasonable. Parties'
objections that their own words should not be used against them

51. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
[a] statement is not hearsay if... The statement is offered against a party
and is (A) the party's own statement in either an individual or a representative capacity or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an
adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by
the party to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement
by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the
agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E)
a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in

furtherance of the conspiracy.
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
52. See supra text accompanying notes 34-46 (discussing biased construction of
agency admissions rule).
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ring hollowr because these parties are not truly penalized when
they cannot introduce the statement they have previously
made.' Parties can simply get on the stand and testify that they
did not run the red light or tell the jury why they pushed the
plaintiff. Parties will not be deprived of any meaningful evidence.
This unbalanced result of admissions does not really matter when
a party's personal words are at issue.

53. As Professor Morgan stated:
A litigant can scarcely complain if the court refuses to take seriously his
allegation that his extra-judicial statements are so little worthy of credence
that the trier of fact should not even consider them. He can hardly be heard
to object that he was not under oath or that he had no opportunity to crossexamine himself. Accordingly, his relevant utterances are everywhere
receivable as admissions against him for the truth of the matter asserted
in them, and it makes no difference whether they were self-serving or
against his interest when made. Their content may affect their weight; it
cannot control their admissibility.
Morgan, The Rationaleof VicariousAdmissions, 42 HARV. L. R.V. 461,461 (1929). Similarly, the drafters of the Federal Rules stated:
Admissions by a party-opponent are excluded from the category of hearsay
on the theory that their admissibility in evidence is the result of the adversary system rather than satisfaction of the conditions of the hearsay
rule.... No guarantee of trustworthiness is required in the case of an
admission. The freedom which admissions have enjoyed from technical demands of searching for an assurance of trustworthiness in some againstinterest circumstance, and from the restrictive influences of the opinion
rule and the rule requiring firsthand knowledge, when taken with the
apparently prevalent satisfaction with the results, calls for generous
treatment of this avenue to admissibility.
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee's note. At least one commentator has taken
issue with the drafters' position:
Taken at face value, though, the "adversary system" is a nonjustificationjustification [for party admissions]-the equivalent of urging "that's the
way the system operates." A decision to admit any proof at trial is as
readily explained, or not explained, as a product of the adversarial method
of trying cases. Of course, here the purported authors of the hearsay proof
are the adversaries themselves. But the connection between the declarants'
status and the manner in which use of their declarations furthers the goals
of the adversarial system is not self-evident.

Bein, Parties'Admissions, Agents' Admissions: Hearsay Wolves in Sheep's Clothing, 12
HOFSTRA L. REv. 393, 419 (1984).
54. The drafters of the Federal Rules confronted
the question whether a prior out-of-court statement by a person now available for cross-examination concerning it, under oath and in the presence of
the trier of fact, should be classed as hearsay. "The position taken by the
Advisory Committee in formulating this part of the rule is founded upon an
unwillingness to countenance the general use of prior prepared statements
as substantive evidence...."
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1) advisory committee's note.
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On the other hand, the bias can have a greater effect when
vicarious admissions are at stake. The truck driver's statement, "I
ran the red light," may be admitted against the truck owner as a
vicarious admission. The comparable statement that the truck
driver did not run the red light, however, cannot be admitted by
the truck owner as an admission. Because of the greater difficulty
of producing a non-party witness as compared to having a party
testify, the truck owner will find it harder to have the favorable
version presented than if personal statements and perceptions of
the party were at stake.
Even so, however, these asymmetrical results do not produce
a rule biased against a class of parties. Although the words and
information of particular witnesses may be treated differently
depending on which party is trying to utilize them, systemic bias
that always, or generally, favors either the class of plaintiffs or
defendants is not produced. Instead, one time a plaintiff may be
aided by vicarious admissions in a civil case, and the next time a
defendant. Either party may be hampered by not being able to
produce the favorable words of the declarant agent, but neither
plaintiffs nor defendants as a group should have the greater
difficulty in producing the helpful information. 55
A subset of vicarious admissions, coconspirator statements in
criminal cases, however, is different and truly biased. First, the
doctrine is biased because only one party, the prosecution, can

55. Just because vicarious admissions are not generally biased against one class of
parties does not mean that the rationale for the doctrine should be insulated from examination. Professor Morgan argued that, "[i]f B authorizes A to speak for him, he can take
no valid exception to the reception of A's statements against him which he could not take
to the reception of his own." Morgan, supra note 53, at 463. Professor Morgan also
argued, however, that other statements of agents should not be admitted as admissions
unless there are guarantees of reliability for the statements: "If such statements are to
be received, their reception must be justified not on any ground of representation but
because of the existence of some independent guaranty of trustworthiness." Id.
Other commentators have taken a similar position.
Taken as an argument that evidence law ought not to unreasonably
impede proof of employee's [sic] acts for which substantive law makes
employers responsible, it is unobjectionable. Where there is reliability and
need for such employee utterances, they should be as admissible as any
others. However, taken as an argument that employee utterances should
be treated as employers' own because there is a need for employers to bear
an evidentiary risk coterminus with their substantive risks, the argument
is specious.
Bein, supra note 53, at 436.

No. 1]

BIASED EVIDENCE RULES

introduce this kind of evidence. Even if the agency admissions rule
is correctly interpreted,56 a criminal defendant still will not be
able to introduce coconspirator admissions. The coconspirator rule
allows admissibility for a statement that "is offered against a party
and is... a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy."'57 While a declarant
could, of course, be a coconspirator of those working for the
government, those government agents are not the party-opponent
of the accused. The government is the party, and the government
itself, as distinguished from its employee, cannot be a conspirator."a Thus, the declarant cannot be a coconspirator of the partyopponent of the criminal defendant. As a result, the defendant
cannot introduce coconspirator admissions in a criminal case.
This fact also makes coconspirator statements in criminal
cases different from vicarious admissions in civil cases generally.
The vicarious admissions doctrine means that the damaging
hearsay of the agent can be introduced against a party without a
guarantee that the party will be able to present that declarant's
favorable information.5 9 The risk of the presentation of adverse
evidence without the introduction of the positive evidence falls
equally on all civil parties.r' In criminal cases, however, only the
government can introduce coconspirator statements, and therefore,
the risk is not equally distributed, but falls solely on the defendant. Furthermore, this bias is exacerbated in criminal cases
because criminal defendants have enormous difficulties producing
the favorable information from the coconspirator declarants whose
damaging hearsay has already been admitted.
In the civil arena, if the truck owner against whom the truck
driver's statements have been admitted wants to elicit additional
information from the driver, the owner can just call the driver to

56. See supra text accompanying notes 34-46 (discussing biased construction of
agency admissions rule).
57. FED. R EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) (emphasis added).
58. Cf. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.10(c), at 262 (2d. ed. 1986)
(asserting "it is universally accepted [that] except where the law defining the offense
specifically provides otherwise, the conduct giving rise to corporate liability must be
'performed by an agent of the corporation acting in behalf of the corporation within the
scope of his office or employment'") (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE-§ 2.07(1) (1962)).
59. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing vicarious admissions in

civil context).
60. See id
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testify. While there is no guarantee that this can be done, the
owner should have no more difficulty doing this than producing
any other witness with information about the litigated event.
Indeed, if the driver remains employed by the owner, the owner
should find it easier to get this testimony than testimony from
other witnesses generally.
The same, of course, is not true for the cri-nal defendant
who wants to solicit further information from the declarant whose
coconspirator statement has been introduced. Since evidence will
have been produced that indicates the declarant is a conspirator,
he will be unlikely to testify willingly. Instead, in all likelihood, he
will refuse to testify for the defense and claim a fifth amendment
right instead.6 ' Thus, the loss of favorable information is not only
biased in the criminal area; it will also occur more frequently and
have more significance than the loss of similar information in civil

trials.
Rules regarding admission of coconspirator statements are
biased, then, and this bias is of the most suspect sort since it
favors the prosecution over criminal defendants. This bias should
not continue. 62 Indeed, it cannot continue. Recent sixth amend-

61. Cf. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986) (confrontation clause of Sixth
Amendment did not require prosecution to produce declarant to have coconspirator
statements admitted).
In Inadi, the court stated:
The declarant and the defendant will have changed from partners in an
illegal conspiracy to suspects or defendants in a criminal trial, each with
information potentially damaging to the other. The declarant himself may
be facing indictment or trial, in which case he has little incentive to aid the
prosecution, and yet will be equally wary of coming to the aid of his former
partners in crime.
Id. at 395. The Court stressed the practical difficulties the prosecution would have if it
were required to produce these declarants. See id. at 399.
However, "[w]hatever difficulty a production burden might give the prosecution,
the difficulty is even greater for a defendant. He has all the problems encountered by the
prosecutor, and then some." Jonakait, supra note 2, at 616 (giving examples of special
difficulties criminal defendants have in producing such declarants).
62. If courts correctly interpreted the vicarious admissions rule so that statements
of government agents were regarded as admissions, the bias of the coconspirator doctrine
would be ameliorated. Professor Imwinkelried contends that the refusal to classify the
statements of government agents as vicarious admissions violates equal protection and
concludes: "[als long as the government enjoys a marked superiority in investigative
resources and views the coconspirator exception as an essential prosecution weapon, the
only feasible cure for the unconstitutionality of the classification will be admitting the
relevant evidence on both sides." Imwinkelried, supranote 1, at 315. Although admitting
the statements of government agents as vicarious admissions would allow the accused
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ment cases reveal that the accused has a compulsory process right
to introduce statements made by coconspirators. These cases hold
that for constitutional purposes statements made by coconspirators
must be considered reliable when introduced by eitherprosecution
or defense, and that the accused, therefore, has a sixth amendment right to introduce this trustworthy evidence.
Bourfaily v. United States3 held that coconspirator statements are inherently reliable.' Earlier, the Supreme Court had
concluded that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause'
allows statements by an absent out-of-court declarant to be
admitted against a criminal defendant "only if [the statement]
bears adequate 'indicia of reliability.' Reliability can be inferred
without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be
excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness."W
This framework raised questions about the constitutionality
of admissions made by coconspirators. On the one hand, coconspirator statements have long been regarded as admissible 6 7 and
have been admitted often.r8 In other words, the coconspirator
exception is firmly rooted in hearsay doctrine. Therefore, this type
of hearsay is reliable according to the confrontation clause
formulation.6 9 On the other hand, the hearsay exception for
coconspirator statements is not based on reliability. Instead,

to introduce some evidence that also would be coconspirator declarations, many other
coconspirator declarations would not be admissible as vicarious admissions of the
government. See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 437 F. Supp. 262 (D. Md. 1977)
(defendant unsuccessfully attempted to introduce declarations by coconspirator's wife),
afftd on othergrounds,602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc).
63. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
64. See id. at 183-84.
65. The Sixth Amendment provides in relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.
" U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
66. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,66 (1980); see also Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139,
3146-47 (1990) (reaffiming Roberts reliability formulation).
67. The origins of the admissibility of coconspirator statements has been traced back
to 17th-century English treason trials. See Mueller, The FederalCoconspiratorException:
Action, Assertion, and Hearsay, 12 HoFsTRA L. REV. 323, 325-31 (1984). The United
States Supreme Court recognized a form of coconspirator statements as early as 1827.
See United States v. Gooding, 25-U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460, 469-70 (1827).
68. See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 398 (1986) ('The co-conspirator rule
apparently is the most frequently used exception to the hearsay rule.").
69. Bourjaily,483 U.S. at 183-84.
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[t]he co-conspirator exception has usually been supported by
a variety of theories unrelated to the trustworthiness of the
evidence itself.... [There] has been.., a seemingly random
appeal to various of the following rationales: (1) a characterization of conspiracy as a relationship of mutual agency, with
the admissions of one conspirator thereby being treated as vicarious admissions by the others; (2) a characterization of
many of the statements of conspirators as "acts" of the
conspiracy (elements, in themselves, of the crime); and (3) an
allegation of special need for lax rules of evidence in prosecu70
tions for such a traditionally secret and inchoate crime.
Since coconspirator statements as a class are not in reality

reliable, the confrontation clause formulation might indicate that
even though these statements fall within a standard hearsay
exception, they could be constitutionally admitted by a prosecutor
only when accompanied with a showing of particularized guar-

70. Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-Conspirator Exception in
CriminalProsecutions: A FunctionalAnalysis, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1378, 1384-85 (1972)
(footnotes omitted); see also Note, FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 801(d)(2)(E) and the
Confrontation Clause: Closing the Window of Admissibility for Coconspirator Hearsay,
53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1291 (1985). Furthermore:
[A] fictional criminal agency theory is frequently used to justify [the]
admissibility of alleged coconspirator's statements.... A more candid
explanation for the coconspirator exception is that coconspirator statements
are necessary tools for prosecuting conspiracies, which are inherently covert
and therefore difficult to prove. . . . Trustworthiness problems with
coconspirator statements... remain manifold.
Id. at 1296-98 (footnotes omitted).
The coconspirator exception evolved differently from other exceptions to the
hearsay rule.
The exceptions to the hearsay rule evolved because of their inherent reliability. The coconspirator exemption, on the other hand, arose as a rule of
conspiracy law, is supported by a series of legal fictions, and is based
primarily upon policy notions that are completely unrelated to evidence
considerations.
Note, Reconciling the Conflict Between the CoconspiratorExemption From the Hearsay
Rule and the ConfrontationClause of the Sixth Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1294,
1300 (1985) (emphasis in original).
The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence also recognized that "the agency
theory of conspiracy is at best a fiction ...
..FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory
committee's note. The advisory committee stated that the reliability of the evidence did
not justify the admissibility of any admissions. "Admissions by a party-opponent are
excluded from the category of hearsay on the theory that their admissibility in evidence
is the result of the adversary system rather than satisfaction of the conditions of the
hearsay rule. . . . No guarantee of trustworthiness is required in thd case of an
admission." FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee's note.
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antees of trustworthiness. Bourjaily resolved this conflict by
rejecting the particularized guarantees approach and deeming all
coconspirator statements falling within the exception constitutionally reliable.
[C]o-conspirators' statements, when made in the course and in
furtherance of the conspiracy, have a long tradition of being
outside the compass of the general hearsay exclusion. Accordingly, we hold that the Confrontation Clause does not require
a court to embark on an independent inquiry into the reliability of statements
that satisfy the requirements of Rule
7

801(d)(2)(E). '

Although the reliability of coconspirator hearsay may truly be
only a fiction, it now has constitutional reality. The prosecutor
offers constitutionally reliable evidence when he presents coconspirator statements. The accused must, therefore, also be submitting reliable evidence when he seeks to introduce coconspirator
hearsay evidence unless that trustworthiness depends on the
identity of the evidence's proponent. Idaho v. Wright7 2 and United
States v. Inadi73 however, show that, under the Sixth Amendment, inherent reliability of coconspirator hearsay does not hinge
on who offers it.
Wright held that certain hearsay statements admitted under
Idaho's residual hearsay exception in a child sexual abuse case
violated the Confrontation Clause.74 In reaching that result, the
Court first decided that Idaho's residual exception was not a firmly
rooted one and, therefore, the evidence could satisfy the Confrontation Clause only if the hearsay had particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.7 5 Such guarantees, the Court continued, had to
produce evidence at least as reliable as that admitted under a
firmly rooted .hearsay exception and that those exceptions
admitted statements "so trustworthy that adversarial testing
would add little to [their] reliability. 7 6 Consequently, hearsay is

71. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 183-84.

72. 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990).

73. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
74. See Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3152-53.
75. See d. at 3147-48.
76. Id. at 3149.
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not constitutionally reliable because it is corroborated by other
trial evidence.7 7 Instead, it satisfies the Sixth Amendment only
if it has the necessary guarantees of trustworthiness at the time
it was uttered:
Thus, unless an affirmative reason, arising from the circumstances in which the statement was made, provides a basis for
rebutting the presumption that a hearsay statement is not
worthy of reliance at trial, the Confrontation Clause requires
exclusion of the... out-of-court statement.
...[The Court declines] to endorse a mechanical test for
determining "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness"
under the Clause. Rather, the unifying principle is that these
factors relate to whether the child declarant was particularly
likely to be telling the truth when the statement was made.78
Wright teaches that reliability is measured not by what
happens at trial, but by what happened at the making of the outof-court statement. The circumstances existing when the statement
was uttered must indicate that adversarial testing would matter
little. The identity of the offering party, then, cannot affect the
constitutional reliability of the hearsay because that identity arises
subsequent to the utterance of the statement.
Coconspirator statements must be reliable, then, because of
the conditions surrounding their utterance. Indeed, in deciding
that the prosecution could constitutionally introduce coconspirator
statements without showing the unavailability of the declarant,
the Supreme Court specifically indicated that this hearsay's chief
value stems from the context of its making.
77. As the Court in Wright explained:
To be admissible under the Confrontation Clause, hearsay evidence used
to convict a defendant must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its
inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to other evidence at trial....
In short, the use of corroborating evidence to support a hearsay
statement's "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" would permit
admission of a presumptively unreliable statement by bootstrapping on the
trustworthiness of other evidence at trial, a result we think at odds with
the requirement that hearsay evidence admitted under the Confrontation
Clause be so trustworthy that cross-examination of the declarant would be
of marginal utility.
Id. at 3150.
78. Id
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Because [the statements] are made while the conspiracy is in
progress, [coconspirator] statements provide evidence of the
conspiracy's context that cannot be replicated, even if the
declarant testifies to the same matters in court. When the
Government-as here-offers the statement of one drug dealer
to another in furtherance of an illegal conspiracy, the statement often will derive its significance from the circumstances
in which it was made. Conspirators are likely to speak
differently when talking-to each other in furtherance of their
illegal aims than when testifying on the witness stand....

[C]o-conspirator statements, derive much of their value
from the fact that they are made in a context very different
from trial, and therefore are usually irreplaceable as substantive evidence.
Coconspirator statements are reliable for constitutional
purposes because of the context in which they were made, not
because of who offers them. This hearsay is trustworthy under the
Sixth Amendment simply because it was made by a conspirator in
furtherance of and during the conspiracy. The context existing at
the time of the statement's utterance makes it reliable. Whenever
a criminal defendant offers coconspirator statements made under
these conditions, he is offering constitutionally reliable evidence.
The happenstance of who the declarant was conspiring with, or
who the parties are now, does not affect the statement's reliability.
Therefore, any statements by a conspirator that aided the illegal
enterprise while the conspiracy existed is trustworthy under the
Sixth Amendment. 0
Consequently, the criminal defendant has a right under the
Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment to introduce
such evidence. While the plain language of that clause might be
read only as a guarantee that a criminal defendant should be able
to subpoena witnesses,8 ' compulsory process also grants a right

79. United States V. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 395-96 (1986).
80. In other words, as long as the statement could have been introduced into a
criminal trial of the declarant's coconspirator, the statement must be constitutionally
reliable when offered by a criminal defendant.
81. The Sixth Amendment provides in relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions,
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to have defense evidence heard by the jury. As the United States
Supreme Court explained:

-

The right to compel a witness' presence in the courtroom could
not protect the integrity of the adversary process if it did not
embrace the right to have the witness' testimony heard by the
trier of fact. The right to offer testimony is thus grounded in
the Sixth Amendment even though it is not expressly
described in so many words ....82

This guarantee of introducing evidence, however, is not
absolute. "[T]he right to present relevant testimony is not without
limitation. The right 'may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.' '
The biased nature of the restriction on defense evidence,

while often important, is not the controlling factor in determining
whether an accused's compulsory process guarantee has been
violated.' Rules that place special burdens on the defendant do

the accused shall enjoy the right... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
82. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409 (1988). The Court then quoted from its first
modern compulsory process case:
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the
right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose
of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own
witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of due
process of law.
Id. (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967)).
83. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 (1987) (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284, 295 (1973)).
84. As commentators have pointed out:
Whenever a rule enables the government to produce witnesses that the
accused cannot, that rule is, under the sixth amendment, suspect. It is but
a small step from this realization to the position that rules that do not
interfere with the defendant's subpoena power but prevent the witnesses
a defendant calls from testifying are likely to offend the core principle of
compulsory process unless the rule would have similarly barred the state
from introducing the evidence in question.
R. LEMPERT & S. SALTzBuRG, supranote 6, at 628; see also White, EvidentiaryPrivileges
and the Defendant's Constitutional Right to Introduce Evidence, 80 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGy 377, 393 (1990) ("Barring unusual circumstances, then, a privilege should
not be invoked to exclude evidence offered by the defense unless it could also be invoked
to exclude comparable evidence offered by the prosecution.").
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not necessarily violate the Sixth Amendment, and evenhanded
rules do not necessarily pass constitutional muster.' Instead,
arbitrariness is the touchstone.8 7 As the Court stated in Rock v.

85. In Taylor v. Illinois, the United States Supreme Court upheld, against a
compulsory process claim, the preclusion of a defense witness whose identity had not
been furnished in accordance with a pretrial discovery request. See 484 U.S. 400, 413
(1980). Although the discovery rules apparently were not biased in the prosecutor's favor,
the opinion does not rely on that fact. The preclusion of the accused's witness because
of the violation of a notice of alibi statute would apparently also be upheld, according to
the logic of Taylor, even though an alibi notice requirement disproportionately affects the
defense, since the accused's violation would prevent the presentation of a defense, while
a prosecutorial violation would only prohibit rebuttal testimony.
Michigan v. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. 1743 (1991), indicates that evidentiary provisions
biased in favor of the prosecution do not always violate the Compulsory Process Clause,'
The Lucas court noted that Wright held that defense evidence can be precluded for
failure to comply with a rape shield statute. See id at 1747-48. The rape shield statute
is not neutral since it only prohibits defense evidence. The Court, relying heavily on
Taylor v. Illinois, decided the case under general sixth amendment rights, without
distinguishing between confrontation and compulsory process rights. See i& at 1748.
86. In Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987), the Court found a compulsory process
violation because Arkansas prohibited the criminal defendant from giving hypnotically
refreshed testimony. See id- at 62. This was not a biased rule, because Arkansas forbade
such testimony by all witnesses. See Rock v. State, 288 Ark. 566, 708 S.W.2d 78, 80
(1986), vacated, 484 U.S. 44 (1987).
87. This was indicated in the Court's first modern compulsory process case, Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967). In Washington the Supreme Court struck down a
Texas rule that prohibited an alleged accomplice from testifying on an accused's behalf
while permitting the alleged accomplice to testify for the prosecution. See id- at 16-17.
Although that bias was important to the outcome, the Court held the rule unconstitutional, not because of the bias, but because of the rule's arbitrariness:
We hold that [Washington] was denied his right to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor because the State arbitrarily denied
him the right to put on the stand a witness who was physically and mentally capable of testifying to events that he had personally observed, and
whose testimony would have been relevant and material to the defense.
Id. at 23.
The bias, however, was an important factor because it was evidence of the rule's
arbitrariness.
The absurdity of the rule is amply demonstrated by the exceptions that
have been made to it. For example, the accused accomplice may be called
by the prosecution to testify against the defendant. Common sense would
suggest that he often has a greater interest in lying in favor of the
prosecution rather than against it, especially if he is still awaiting his own
trial or sentencing. To think that criminals will lie to save their fellows but
not to obtain favors from the prosecution for themselves is indeed to clothe
the criminal class with more nobility than one might expect to find in the
public at large. Moreover, under the Texas statutes the accused accomplice
is no longer disqualified if he is acquitted at his own trial. Presumably, he
would then be free to testify on behalf of his comrade, secure in the
knowledge that he could incriminate himself as freely as he liked in his
testimony, since he could not again be prosecuted for the same offense. The
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Arkansas,' which held unconstitutional a rule prohibiting the
accused's hypnotically refreshed testimony, "restrictions of a
defendant's right to testify may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve. In applying its
evidentiary rules a State must evaluate whether the interests
served by a rule justify the limitation imposed on the defendant's
constitutional right to testify."89
Restrictions are not arbitrary if they reasonably help to
assure an orderly trial and do not forbid the accused from
presenting favorable evidence to the jury.90 Discovery provisions

Texas law leaves him free to testify when he has a great incentive to
perjury, and bars his testimony in situations where he has a lesser motive
to lie.
Id. at 22-23. Justice Harlan, concurring in the result, found a due process violation, not
a compulsory process one, precisely because of the bias: "[T]he State may not constitutionally forbid.., a criminal defendant [ from introducing on his own behalf the
important testimony of one indicted in connection with the same offense, who would not,
however, be barred from testifying if called by the prosecution." Id. at 24 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
Professor Westen summarizes Washington v. Texas as follows:
Washington... construed the defendant's right to present witnesses in his
favor without reference to the corresponding rights of the prosecution.
Justice Harlan invited the Court to invalidate the Texas rule not because
it was arbitrary, but because it discriminated against the accused....
The Court, while agreeing with Harlan that the rule was discriminatory, refused to rest on that narrow ground. It distinguished between the
discriminatory effect of the rule and its "arbitrary" effect.
Westen, The Compulsory ProcessClause,73 MICH. L. REV. 73, 116 (1974) (footnote omitted). However, Professor White states that "[t]he principle of evenhandedness finds
support in... Washington v. Texas.... In condemning a Texas rule of incompetency as
arbitrary, the Court emphasized that the Texas rule did not apply to government evidence in the same way as it did to defense evidence." White, supra note 84, at 401
(footnote omitted).
The discriminatory use of evidence also can play an important role in determining
due process violations. In Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979), the Court found a due
process violation when Green, the defendant, was not allowed to introduce a codefendant's confession into his capital sentencing trial. See id at 97. The Court held that the
confession should have been admitted because it was highly relevant and good reason
existed to believe it reliable. See id. The Court noted, "Perhaps most important, the State
considered the testimony sufficiently reliable to use it against [the codefendant], and to
base a sentence of death upon it." Id
88. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
89. Id. at 55-56. This principle applies not only to rules that totally prevent a
witness from testifying, but also to rules that prohibit part of a person's testimony. "Just
as a State may not apply an arbitrary rule of competence to exclude a material defense
witness from taking the stand, it also may not apply a rule of evidence that permits a
witness to take the stand, but arbitrarily excludes material portions of his testimony."
Id. at 55.
90. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982). In Valenzuela-
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provide an example. The state has a legitimate interest in an

efficient discovery process.9 ' Furthermore, such restrictive rules
do not prevent the accused from presenting testimony, for as long
as the defendant follows the prescribed procedures, he can introduce his favorable evidence to the jury. Consequently, sanctions for
defense
violations of discovery provisions are not unconstitution92
al.
In contrast, restrictions placed on the defense are arbitrary
if they prevent the accused from presenting evidence that could
reasonably sway the jury. "Our cases establish, at a minimu,
that criminal defendants have the right to the government's
assistance in compelling the attendance of favorable witnesses at
trial and the right to put before a93 jury evidence that might
influence the determination of guilt."
Evidentiary rules that forbid a criminal defendant from
presenting unreliable evidence or evidence that cannot be accurately evaluated by the jury will not violate the Compulsory
Process Clause. Such proof cannot properly influence the determination of guilt.94 The Supreme Court has made clear, however,
that this principle cannot justify the exclusion of a category of
evidence, even though that category generally contains untrustworthy information, if it might be trustworthy some of the tim or
if it is possible for the jury still to evaluate it. As Rock v. Arkansas
concluded:
A State's legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence

Bernal, the court held that "more than the mere absence of testimony is necessary to
establish a violation of the [compulsory process] right.... [The defendant] must at least
make some plausible showing of how [the] testimony would-have been both material and
favorable to his defense." Id. at 867. While this may be a significant burden when
potential defense witnesses have been deported, as they were in Valenzuela-Bernal,
examining the content of the coconspirator hearsay should easily reveal whether the
proffered information is material and favorable to the defense.
91. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 411 (1988). In Taylor, the Court held that
"[t]he State's interest in the orderly conduct of a criminal trial is sufficient to justify the
imposition and enforceiaent of firm, though not always inflexible, rules relating to the
identification and presentation of evidence." Id
92. See id. at 415-16; see also Michigan v. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. 1743 (1991) (upholding
preclusion of evidence for defense violations of discovery provisions).

93. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987).
94. See Westen, Compulsory Process II, 74 MIcH. L. REV. 192, 213 (1975) (defense
evidence can be excluded if it "is so inflammatory or prejudicial as to induce the factfinder to disregard its instructions and decide the case on irrational grounds").
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does not extend to per se exclusions that may be reliable in an
individual case. Wholesale inadmissibility of a defendant's
testimony is an arbitrary restriction on the right to testify in
the absence of clear evidence by the State repudiating the
validity of all post-hypnosis recollections.... [The State] has
not shown that hypnotically enhanced testimony is always so
untrustworthy and so immune to the traditional means of
evaluating credibility that it should disable a defendant from
presenting her version of the events for which she is on

trial.
This principle means that the per se rule preventing a

criminal defendant from introducing coconspirator statements
made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy violates the
Compulsory Process Clause. Coconspirator hearsay offered by an
accused is not so unreliable that it could not be reliable in an
individual case. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held such evidence

inherently reliable for sixth amendment purposes. Coconspirator
statements can be evaluated by the jury, as its widespread admission against criminal defendants indicates. The rule preventing

the defendant from introducing such evidence is arbitrary and
violates the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause.9
While biased evidence rules may not invariably violate the
Compulsory Process Clause, that clause does require that the

95. 483 U.S. at 61; cf. Westen, supranote 87, at 133-36 (defendant has constitutional
right to produce any witness whose ability to give reliable evidence is something about
which reasonable people can differ).
96. It is difficult to tell at this point whether recognizing the defendant's right to
introduce coconspirator statements will have much significance. Attorneys have not been
seeking admission of evidence on this ground, and there is now no way to gauge the
prevalence of such evidence that the defense would like to introduce. Such cases,
however, do exist. See United States v. Mandel, 437 F. Supp. 262 (D. Md. 1977), affd on
othergrounds, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc). In Mandel the prosecution claimed
that Hess, the Rodgers brothers, and Governor Mandel were in cahoots in nefarious
activities involving a racetrack. Mandel sought to introduce statements of Dorothy
Rodgers, wife of one of the defendants, that she heard Hess and her husband state that
Governor Mandel would be shocked by the activities of Hess and Rodgers. See id. at 263.
Rodgers then instructed her to keep those activities secret from the Governor. See id.
These statements certainly appear to be statements of conspirators made during and in
furtherance of a conspiracy. Mandel, however, could not get Mrs. Rodgers testimony
admitted under Rule 801(d)(1)(E). In fact, the trial court did not even discuss the
coconspirator exemption and only analyzed whether the statements were admissible
under Rule 803(3), the hearsay exception for statements of then existing mental,
emotional, or physical condition. See id. at 264. Such testimony, however, should now be
admitted because it is required by the Compulsory Process Clause.
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accused be allowed to introduce coconspirator statements in his
defense.

VI. CONCLUSION

Evidence rules that do not grant the parties equal mechanisms for admitting or excluding evidence can harm the adversary
system. The judiciary, however, should not reform all such biased
provisions. A court's course of action should depend on whether
the rule is affecting civil or criminal actions, which party is
favored by the rule, and how the bias was created. Any rule that
makes distinctions between civil parties, tilts toward the prosecution, or was manufactured by a court's interpretation of a
neutral provision should be changed.

